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ABSTRACT
This paper follows up on a recent pre-print (Durham [2005]) by first deriving a set theoretic relationship
between the generalized uncertainty relations and the Clauser-Horne inequalities.  The physical,
metaphysical, and metamathematical implications and problems are then explored.  The discussion builds
on previous work by Pitowsky [1994] and suggests that there is a fundamental problem in quantum
correlation that could potentially lead to a paradox.  It leaves open the question of whether the problem is in
experiment, theory, or phenomena.
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1 Introduction
In a recent pre-print I pointed out the numerous similarities between Bell-type
inequalities and the generalized uncertainty relations, particularly in the context of
conditional events (Durham [2005]).  The thought experiment suggested in part 3 of that
pre-print is a clear indication that this relationship is no coincidence.  It turns out that a
combination of set theory and logic can serve to show that the Bell-type inequalities
known as the Clauser-Horne inequalities (or CH74 inequalities, Clauser & Horne [1974])
are a subset of the generalized uncertainty relations.  Of course this begs the question of
how realism is properly dealt with since it is an assumption at the heart of Bell’s theorem.
Interestingly enough, realism is not invoked at all in the process.  However, in pondering
the problem I have also made a distinctly philosophical suggestion regarding physical
realism (to be distinguished from mathematical realism) and what its presence in
quantum mechanics combined with my result might imply.
Much of the logic governing these various inequalities was actually first
developed by George Boole in his analysis of ‘conditions of possible experience.’
Boole’s priority was established a decade ago by Pitowsky [1994].  Pitowsky analyzed in
detail the subsequent ways in which Boole’s conditions could be violated and his analysis
proves to be useful in supporting the CH74-Uncertainty relation developed in this pre-
print.  In addition his algorithm for developing Boolean conditions is employed to
produce a Boolean representation of the uncertainty relations.  But first, let us derive the
relationship that is the source of these philosophical problems.  It is mathematical in the
sense that it employs a bit of set theory, logic, and interval arithmetic.  However, I make
every attempt to define everything such that one need not be well-versed in any of the
higher-order mathematics in order to understand the derivation.  In addition I should note
that I employ notation consistent with that employed by Gullberg [1998] simply in an
effort to reach as wide an audience as possible.
2 Preliminaries
In their 1974 paper, Clauser and Horne offer a proof of the following: given six numbers,
x1, x2, y1, y2, X, and Y, such that
  
0 ≤ x1 ≤ X
0 ≤ x2 ≤ X
0 ≤ y1 ≤Y
0 ≤ y2 ≤Y
then 
  
−XY ≤ f (x,y) ≤ 0 where
  
f (x,y) = x1y1 − x1y2 + x2y1 + x2y2 −Yx2 − Xy1.
Once again, the last inequality is satisfied for any six numbers (the numbers do not have
to represent anything) as long as the first set of four inequalities is satisfied.  Set
theoretically we can represent this most generally as
  
χ = f (x,y)−XY ≤ f (x,y) ≤ 0;0 ≤ xn ≤ X;0 ≤ yn ≤Y{ } (1).
For now I will refrain from defining f(x,y) in these terms.  Notice also that I have
refrained from specifying whether the numbers are real or complex.
Representing the uncertainty relations in an analogous way requires a bit more
manipulation but is nonetheless possible.  Let us begin by restating the generalized
uncertainty relation as follows (see Liboff [1998]): given a commutation relation of the
form 
  
A,B[ ] = C , then
  
ΔA ⋅ ΔB ≥ 12 C .
The left side of the inequality represents the spread in the measurements of A and B.  Of
course, a spread is an interval and each of these can be represented in set theoretic terms
as 
  
ΔA = [a, ′ a ] = x a ≤ x ≤ ′ a { } and 
  
ΔB = [b, ′ b ] = y b ≤ y ≤ ′ b { }.  The product of the two
intervals is another interval given by
  
ΔA ⋅ ΔB = [a, ′ a ] = [b, ′ b ] = [min(ab,a ′ b , ′ a b, ′ a ′ b ),max(ab,a ′ b , ′ a b, ′ a ′ b )].
For simplicity’s sake I will represent this combined interval as 
  
Ψ = z zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax{ }.  To
incorporate the right side of the generalized uncertainty relation let me first define
  
Z = 12 C .  Therefore the generalized uncertainty relation becomes
  
Ψ = [zmin,zmax ] ≥ Z .
This says that the interval (or, more correctly, its length), Ψ, must be greater than or
equal to half of Z.  Working from the minimum requirement that the two are equal we can
write 
  
zmax − zmin = Z  or 
  
zmin = zmax − Z .  The interval can then be given as
  
zmax − Z ≤ z ≤ zmax .  With just a bit more algebra (I hope I haven’t lost anyone yet) this
can be rearranged (by subtracting out the zmax across the inequality) to read
  
−Z ≤ z − zmax ≤ 0 .
In doing this I have incorporated the minimum condition of the inequalty in the
uncertainty relation into the interval.  Basically, this encapsulates the minimum
requirements of the uncertainty relation and incorporates both sides of the inequality.
The interval can then be written in set theoretic terms as
  
Ψ = f (z)−Z ≤ f (z) ≤ 0;zmin ≤ c ≤ zmax{ } (2).
Our task, then, is to compare (1) and (2).
3 A Meta Challenge
3.1 Part I: Metamathematics
Let us call Ψ the Uncertainty Set and χ the Clauser-Horne Set.  Compare, once again,
their similar structure:
Uncertainty Set                                               Clauser-Horne Set                                          
  
Ψ = f (z)−Z ≤ f (z) ≤ 0;zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax{ }
  
χ = f (x,y)−XY ≤ f (x,y) ≤ 0;x,y ∈ R+{ }
The first major point I’d like to make is that χ admits only positive reals while I have
made no such stipulation for Ψ .  This is because, as we well know, the uncertainty
relation can and does admit complex numbers.  In addition it is important to remember
that Ψ was derived for the minimum requirements set forth by the uncertainty relations.  χ
has no such stipulation.  Note also that nowhere did I include the commutation relation as
a stipulation for Ψ.  This is an issue that needs to be addressed as well.  In addition two
metaphysical points that need to be addressed are the principle of local realism in relation
to χ and causality in relation to Ψ (I do not purport to ‘solve’ local realism or causality,
simply point out their relation to this problem).
I can actually deal with a few of these problems simultaneously.  The
commutation relation is usually formulated as a prerequisite to the uncertainty relations.
However, there is nothing anywhere that requires either to be logically prior to the other.
So, more correctly, the commutation relation is a corequisite of the uncertainty relations
but only in the sense that if one exists so does the other.  Therefore it is not necessary to
include the commutation relation in the uncertainty set’s list of conditionals.  However,
the commutation relation does tell us something very important about the uncertainty
relations: that complex results are a possibility, i.e. Z could be (and very often is) a
complex number.  So, though the commutation relation itself may not appear in the
uncertainty set’s list of conditionals it does lead to the condition that complex numbers
are allowed.  Of course, as I first pointed out, χ only allows positive reals.  Once again,
let us compare the two with the added conditions of complexity for Ψ.
Uncertainty Set                                               Clauser-Horne Set                                          
  
Ψ = f (z)−Z ≤ f (z) ≤ 0;z ∈ C{ }  
  
χ = f (x,y)−XY ≤ f (x,y) ≤ 0;x,y ∈ R+{ }
Note that I also eliminated the interval for z just as I eliminated the intervals for x and y
before.  How can I justify this?  Well, theoretically the intervals of A and B separately
range from -∞ to +∞.  They are only limited when they are taken together in relation to Z.
So z itself, which is just the interval product of A and B, can range from -∞ to +∞ as well.
The uncertainty relation only stipulates that whatever z happens to be (and it can be
anything), f(z) must be between –Z and 0.
Now, given the definitions I have just established for Ψ  and χ, what sort of
mathematical relationships can we draw between the two?  First, since any real number
can simply be represented as a complex number with the complex part set to zero, it is
true that 
  
R+ ⊆ C.  Second, the real part of Z can always be decomposed into a product of
two smaller real numbers each of which could possibly be positive.  We can say, then,
that 
  
Re Z( ) ≥ XY .  Therefore Ψ must have a greater cardinality than χ.
Before any definitive relational statement about Ψ and χ, we should be sure that
the nature of the functions f(x,y) and f(z) don’t prevent us from doing so.  Ah, but that is
the beauty of the representation.  It is in fact the values of those functions that are defined
on the given intervals in the defined sets not the functions themselves.  And, since the
values in χ are a subset of those in Ψ we really don’t have problem.  In addition, what is
a function other than a mapping?  Metamathematically one might say that functions are
no more than a way to condense a series of numbers into a more convenient package.
Two functions that produce identical numerical results must ultimately be identical.  In
addition, I should note that the Clauser-Horne inequalities (i.e. such that 
  
−1≤ f (x,y) ≤ 0)
are merely an element (or subset) of χ just as the position-momentum or energy-time
uncertainty relations are elements (or subsets) of Ψ.  This distinction is important for the
conclusion of the derivation which is that
χ ⊆ Ψ.
Metamathematically, if one were to argue that it matters not what the numbers
represent, simply that they allow for this behavior, we could stop there.  The
metamathematical argument here brings to mind the views of Wittgenstein and Hilbert.
If the formalists and Sophists both in mathematics and physics were right then, by
stripping everything to its barest essentials, the formalism represented in my
manipulation of the given symbols under the stated rules, then I need not go any further.
The problem, of course, resides with the late enigma Kurt Gödel.  The incompleteness
theorem, in particular the second incompleteness theorem, puts a serious crimp in the
formalist program.  In simplified terms, the second incompleteness theorem states “that
the consistency of a formal system that contains arithmetic can’t be formally proven
within that system.”1  Whatever we might argue, it is enough to prod us into an
examination of the physical (metamathematical?) and metaphysical problems I
mentioned above.  And, it turns out, such an examination will prove useful.
3.2 Part II: Metaphysics
Despite the results of Gödel (and also Turing)2, the desire of Wittgenstein and Hilbert
(not to mention Frege) is seductive, at least from a physical (as opposed to mathematical)
standpoint.  Eddington in his Fundamental Theory [1946] basically attempted to
axiomatize (formalize) physics while simultaneously uniting relativity and quantum
mechanics.  Of course he wasn’t generally successful, but his methods have left some
useful nuggets (see Durham [2004]) and his mere attempt gives strict formalists some
hope.  Without taking a side in this argument (my own opinion might be surprising) I
think it is worth attempting to attach a mathematical form to some of the metaphysical
concepts represented in this problem.
Since χ is simply a generalized set theoretic representation of the Clauser-Horne
inequalities, if we are to go beyond the strictly formal aspects of the system we must
reconcile the result with local realism since it plays such an important role in any Bell-
type inequality.  A very generalized version of Bell’s theorem essentially states that local
realism implies some inequality.  Experimental violation of Bell-type inequalities is taken
to mean that local realism is incompatible with quantum mechanics.  These inequalities
are, in fact, just forms of Boole’s ‘conditions of possible experience.’  As Pitowsky
points out, “none of Boole’s conditions of possible experience can ever be violated when
all the relative frequencies involved have been measured in a single sample. ”3
Technically this is assuming that the numbers involve probabilities that are interpreted as
relative frequencies (whether or not they actually are, they manifest as such in the case of
repeatable, exchangeable, or independent events).  However, the additional boundary
conditions for xn and yn supplied by Clauser and Horne in the generalization release us
from the requirement that the numbers must be interpreted as probabilities (falling
                                                 
1 Goldstein [2005], p. 183.  See also the English translation of Gödel’s theorem by Meltzer [1962].
2 Turing’s most seminal work in mathematical logic can be found in Davis [2004].  In addition most of
Turing’s writing (published and unpublished) can be found online at http://www.turing.org.uk.
3 Pitowsky [1994], p.105.
between 0 and 1).  Thus, in the purely general form presented here χ does not necessarily
need to be applied to the case of probabilities as relative frequencies.  Obviously from an
experimental standpoint it might be difficult to manifest in any other way, but I am
unaware of any conclusive proof of its impossibility.  In addition, Pitowsky points out
that Boole’s conditions can not only be derived from probability theory but also from
propositional logic (Pitowsky [1994]) meaning probabilities are not a priori required
even though that is the form in which Boole himself derived his conditions.  It is
questionable, then, if it is the relative frequency interpretation that leads to the
inequalities as Pitowsky points out.  If we use propositional logic instead (which certainly
can be related to probabilities and relative frequencies but doesn’t have to be) we still
arrive at the same conditions with the same inequalities.
Opening χ up to numbers other than probabilities still does nothing for local
realism but returning to Pitowsky’s point, Boole’s conditions are not violated if all
measurements are taken on a single sample.  In addition since Boole’s conditions can be
derived from very elementary assumptions the puzzling aspects of quantum mechanics
are not only in the theory but also in the physical phenomena themselves (Pitowsky
[1994]).  Physically the puzzling aspects are usually ascribed to interference.  As I will
point out, despite its inherent metaphysical problems, when linked with a
metamathematical interpretation the fog seems to clear a bit.  But how does the sampling
affect the assumption of local realism and what does it have to say (if anything) about the
puzzling nature of quantum mechanics?
It is time to phrase local realism in a more formal way.  Local realism, of course,
is the combination of the Principle of Locality – that no information can travel faster than
the speed of light – with the idea of realism – that measurements exist regardless of
whether or not they’ve actually been measured, i.e. any correlation is a priori to the
moment of measurement.  I take ‘information’ to mean anything – photons, massive
particles, anything.  The requirement, then, that no information travel faster than the
speed of light can be given the mathematical expression 
  
˙ I ≤ c  where 
  
˙ I is the rate of
change of the ‘information,’ in a sense it’s speed.  Is there a similar way to represent
realism?  The question may be partially tied to the truth of realism.  For example, if
realism is false – if these measurements are not a priori correlated – there shouldn’t be
any mathematical way to represent realism.  Of course, this conclusion is based on the
assumption that all mathematics represents something physical which is an open
question.  Actually, the circular nature of this problem needn’t necessarily saddle us at
the moment since the following suggestion makes no progress towards a solution – nor is
it intended to.  It is simply a suggested formal way to represent physical realism in
quantum mechanical situations.
The suggestion begins with the recognition that the puzzles in quantum mechanics
that are discussed herein – namely violations of Boole’s conditions of possible experience
– are due to a phenomena most physicists (this one sometimes included, particularly in
pedagogical situations) refer to as interference.  But as Pitowsky points out the very
meaning of the term is at stake here (Pitowsky [1994]).  Whatever it is we might call it, it
is mathematically represented in the formal equations of quantum mechanics by the
imaginary parts of complex numbers.  From a measurement standpoint we can only
measure the real parts of the complex numbers, nonetheless the effects of the imaginary
portions of these numbers is clearly qualitatively observable.  In some sense one could
argue they are also quantitatively observable, but the values themselves are not directly
measurable.  Let’s take stock of just what this implies: we have numerical values that we
can theoretically infer and whose effects can qualitatively be observed but that cannot be
directly measured.  If a way to directly measure these observables were to be developed it
would seem to be evidence of physical realism since the a priori correlation between the
real and imaginary parts of the complex values was established prior to any measurement
of the imaginary portions having taken place.  The argument falls well short of a proof
but is a tantalizing suggestion that also provides us a ‘temporary’ way to formally
represent realism: complex valued observables.  Realism in this sense, then, is already
present in Ψ  and χ (in the latter by the fact that 
  
R+ ⊆ C since real numbers are just
complex numbers whose imaginary parts are 0).
Having put local realism on a formal (or semi-formal) footing, we are left with the
metaphysical aspects of uncertainty.  The problem that would prove the most difficult to
reconcile with χ would be issues of causality.  However, the uncertainty relations
themselves, stripped bare of interpretation, are not inherently acausal.  In fact Heisenberg
originally stated that he had attempted to maintain causality and thereby preserve
consistency with relativity (Jammer [1966]).  His rationale was that uncertainty did not
specifically restrict our knowledge of the future, rather that it restricted our knowledge of
the present.  In essence our knowledge of the present is incomplete and until found to be
complete our knowledge of the future will be limited.  As such, for the time being, if we
assume uncertainty is causal it is correspondingly local.
Therefore we find that only one additional condition needs to be added to Ψ and
χ, that of locality, since we have already accounted for realism through the complex
number conditional 
  
R+ ⊆ C.  As such, we can write
Uncertainty Set                                           Clauser-Horne Set                                              
  
Ψ = f (z)−Z ≤ f (z) ≤ 0;z ∈ C; ˙ I ≤ c{ }          
  
χ = f (x,y)−XY ≤ f (x, y) ≤ 0;x, y ∈ R+; ˙ I ≤ c{ }
Given the formalized meta-conclusions, our statement that 
  
χ ⊆ Ψ now has a more solid
foundation.  I will discuss the implications of this in the next section.
4 Implications and Interpretations
From an interpretational standpoint, Von Neumann’s idea that any observable that was
uncertain had no value at all would seem to reduce everything – uncertainty included – to
essentially binary results.  Certainly this is an interpretation in the extreme.  Nonetheless,
as van Fraassen points out
One recurring worry among philosophers is that the appearance of the term ‘measurement’ in the
Born Rule bears its anthropocentric connotations essentially.  That would mean that we cannot
think of quantum theory as a putative autonomous description of the world in neutral physical
terms and prospectively complete.  In the jargon: if that were so, we could not be realists with
respect to the theory, but only instrumentalists.  This worry is much reinforced by ‘philosophical’
discussions by some of the great physicists who were involved in the development of quantum
theory.  [That question has been laid] to rest, since the requirements upon physical correlates of
measurement involved no reference to us, to persons or consciousness, and not even to the macro-
micro distinction.4
He goes on to make a very important point: that if the significance of the measurement
itself is gone and we are left to the assignment of probabilities, “the given had better be
handled very delicately.”  Fundamentally, this is reminiscent of precisely what
Heisenberg had originally implied – uncertainty lies in our knowledge of the present.
Van Fraassen’s point is that it is not just our knowledge of the present that is the problem
but how we apply it.  For example, as Pitowsky pointed out, violations of inequalities
representing Boole’s conditions of possible experience are logically impossible if taken
on a single sample.  Perhaps a measurement on a single sample such as this is not
possible, but perhaps it’s not.  Until conclusive evidence exists either way we should
proceed with caution.  In regard to the conclusion of my derivation, 
  
χ ⊆ Ψ, this suggests
that it would be best to ensure the firm mathematical foundation before proceeding to the
metamathematical, physical, and metaphysical.
Just what would the conclusion that 
  
χ ⊆ Ψ mean for quantum mechanics?  Let
me first state emphatically that it would not mean that the CH74 inequalities were a
subset or Boolean limit on the position-momentum or energy-time uncertainty relations.
Clearly they deal with separate phenomena.  However, the CH74 inequalities are
elements of a set, χ, that is a subset of the set Ψ, of which the uncertainty relations are
elements.  The uncertainty relations, however, are not elements of χ.  In addition, there is
an uncertainty relation for Pauli spin matrices and also one for spin angular momentum,
the same phenomena dealt with in the CH74 case.  This suggests, then, that there ought to
be an inequality similar in form to the CH74 inequalities that describes a binary (probably
instrumental) case of simultaneous position-momentum or energy-time measurement.  In
fact Pitowsky provides the algorithm (see the Appendices of Pitowsky [1994]) by which
this can be done.  In my recent pre-print (Durham [2005]) I provided, in section 3, a
thought experiment to match.  The resulting inequality is trivial – {0 ≤ p1 + p2 ≤ 1} – but
nonetheless matches the thought experiment (there is no p12 term for simultaneous exact
measurements).
The metaphysical implications of this are that the underlying theorem of the
CH74 inequalities, which is essentially Bell’s theorem, appears to be an element of a set
of theories that also includes Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle as an element.  This
further suggests that there ought to be some theory that unites these two.  In addition, any
assumptions found (i.e. proven) to be fundamental to Bell’s theorem must also be
fundamental to the larger set that includes uncertainty.  This would include realism,
locality, causality, etc.  Despite suggestions to the contrary (including my own regarding
complex numbers in the previous section) realism is unlikely to be proven one way or
another, partly due to incompleteness.  Locality, on the other hand, is concretely
measurable.  In addition, a general conclusion of this work is that if violations of the
CH74 and other Bell-type inequalities exist there ought to also exist violations of
Heisenberg-type (uncertainty) inequalities, particularly if they are consistent with Boole’s
conditions of possible experience.  However, in keeping with Boole’s conditions
                                                 
4 van Fraassen [1991], p. 284.
violations could only be a logical possibility if taken on multiple samples since Pitowsky
has shown violations on single samples to be logically impossible.
Finally, if local realism is a theoretical necessity for the Clauser-Horne
inequalities, my result suggests that it ought to be a theoretical necessity for the
generalized uncertainty relations as well.  But, before this suggestion elicits too many
“groans,” recall that the violations of Bell-type inequalities that purported to show the
irreconcilability of local realism with quantum mechanics had to have been performed on
the equivalent of multiple samples.  Therefore, as long as the single sample requirement
is met, there should be no inequality violation, and thus no contradiction between local
realism and quantum mechanics.
5 Conclusions and Further Suggestions
The major conclusion of this work also happens to be a suggestion.  As my discussion in
the previous section has pointed out, building on the work of Pitowsky, my set theoretic
results suggests a way to bring uncertainty into the fold of Boole’s conditions of probable
experience.  It underscores the importance of Pitowsky’s results by suggesting that the
problem lies in the experiment rather than in the theory.  Now, whether that problem can
be overcome is another matter entirely.  It is possible that measurements on single
samples can actually be achieved in which case Boole’s conditions can be thoroughly
tested.  Obviously any violation then would need to be meticulously analyzed to
determine whether the problem lay in the experiment or in Boole’s and Pitowsky’s (and
subsequently my) reasoning.  But Pitowsky’s work appears fairly solid and I personally
doubt a violation following strict single sample guidelines could occur.  With that said, if
such a violation were to occur it might suggest a fundamental limitation on our very
ability to make such a measurement.  Perhaps it is just not possible to make such a
measure on a single sample (though it might be possible to delude ourselves into thinking
we succeeded).
Would this last point, then, be an instrumentation limit or something deep in the
actual phenomenon?  The latter point seems as if it would be paradoxical.  Take the
example of a pair of entangled electrons.  If we were to succeed in sampling a singlet
state to the point where we were absolutely confident in our experimental apparatus (i.e.
experimentally certain that we had a single sample), and yet we obtain a violation
nonetheless, it would suggest that the two electrons were not actually correlated in any
way.  But if we know from our initial conditions that the two electrons are entangled,
they have to be correlated and therein lies the paradox.  If one were to take a more
formalist point of view and assume that Boole’s conditions (and related derivations and
inequalities) are all there is to the nature of the problem then one might be inclined to say
that there simply cannot be a paradox and therefore we should try again.  In essence a
true formalist might say that there never will be a paradoxical situation like this.  On the
other hand a Platonist might be more skeptical, perhaps even going so far as to expect a
paradox.  But paradox’s usually arise from an ill-formed argument and if one arose in this
case both the experiment as well as the theory should be examined.
In any case, there seems to be a troubling problem with our usual conceptions of
quantum correlation (which was problematic enough to begin with).  It is distinctly
possible that the resolution to this problem will evade us forever.  My conclusion,
however, should help clarify different aspects of the problem by providing additional
conditions to be included in experiment.
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